Off-line phase:
guess pab, decrypt {f (n)} pab , {f (c)} pab encrypt (c, n) with pk(b) verify.
Heather et al.'s solution:
• Tag each field with it's type;
• eg. na as (nonce, na);
• Problem when used in password protocols: Tags verify guess directly!!
• eg. {na} passwd(a,b) as {nonce, na} passwd(a,b) ;
• Decrypt with guess, check for "nonce";
• If found, verifies the guess rightaway!!
• Conclusion: Heather et al.'s solution cannot be used in password protocols.
Hypothesis:
Avoiding tags inside password encryptions prevent most type-flaw guessing attacks.
Proof Strategy:
Aim:
Protocol is secure without type-flaws ⇒ Protocol secure under tagging Therefore, prove that Attack on tagging scheme ⇒ Attack when all fields correctly tagged.
Proof parts
1. On-line communication;
2. Off-line guessing and verification.
Part 1:
Using Heather et al.'s results in [HLS00].
Part 2:
Using our def of guessing attacks [CMAE03].
Protocol model • Based on Heather et al.'s [HLS00];
• Message structure -Tags, Facts and Taggedfacts.
• Tags -agent, nonce, . . . ;
• Facts -Atom, Pairs, Encryptions;
• TaggedFacts -(tag,fact);
• Well-tagged fact -Tag is indeed the type of the fact.
Protocol model -Continued ...
• Our change: Treat password encryptions as subset of Atoms;
• i.e. Password encryptions as an "abstract type";
• Possible because we disallow attacker operations on them;
• Do not consider password learnt by breaching secrecy;.
• Framework -Strand spaces 1. Strands -Communications of honest agent or penetrator;
2. Bundle -Partial or complete protocol run.
• Honest strands -Modelled using "strand templates";
• Strand templates output honest strands after instantiation.
• Penetrator strands -Dolev-Yao attacker with standard inference rules.
Transforming arbitrarily tagged bundles to welltagged bundles
• Define a renaming function φ;
• φ changes an aribtrary bundle C to a well-tagged bundle;
• Possible because, if honest agent accepts ill-tagged fact, it should accept any value in it's place;
• Show if s is an honest strand, so is φ(s) (from [HLS00,Lemma 3.2]);
• Show if s is a penetrator strand, so is φ(s) (from [HLS00,section 3.3]).
Part 1: Results in [HLS00,Theorem 1]
If C is a bundle (under the tagging scheme) then there is a renaming function φ and a bundle C , such that:
• C contains the tagged facts of C (considered as a set), renamed by φ;
• C contains the same honest strands as C, modulo some renaming;
• facts are uniquely originating in C if they were uniquely originating in C;
• all tagged facts in C are well-tagged.
Part 2: Guessing attacks
Off-line attacker capabilities:
• Use a guess to encrypt and decrypt password encryptions;
• Split and concatenate facts;
• Tag facts and untag taggedfacts.
• Given bundle C and taggedfact tf ; -Define |= on C and tf such that C |= tf if, -There exist a valid sequence of attacker actions to produce tf from C;
Defining guessing attacks
• Attacker must synthesize a term in two ways using a guess;
• But in atmost one way without using the guess;
Formally, Definition 1. g is verifiable from C and tf is a verifier for g iff:
1.Ĉ ∪ {g} |= tf ∧Ĉ ∪ {g} |=tf ; and 2.Ĉ |= tf ∨Ĉ |=tf .
wheretf is a fresh constant andĈ is obtained by replacing the particular occurrence of tf in C, withtf .
Lemma 1.
C ∪ {g} |= tr tf ⇒ C ∪ {g} |= φ(tr) φ(tf ).
i.e attacker can derive a term from C if the corresponding term is derivable from C.
Corollary 1.
C |= tf ⇒ C |= φ(tf ).
i.e. attacker cannot derive a term from C if the corresponding term is not derivable from C.
Main result
• Let C be denoted as C.
• If guessing attack on C, then, 1.Ĉ ∪ {g} |= tf ∧Ĉ ∪ {g} |=tf ; and 2.Ĉ |= tf ∨Ĉ |=tf .
• Rewrite above expressions, 1 .Ĉ ∪ {g} |= tf ∧Ĉ ∪ {g} |=t f ; and 2 .Ĉ |= tf ∨Ĉ |=t f .
• Possible because of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1;
• Therefore, attack on C ⇒ attack on C . (c) Above two required for "real-world" protocols.
